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Extending the Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition to 




A necessary step in the process of enhancing Sea 
Warrior performance is the ability to analyze 
performance via a comprehensive Human – 
System approach.  Such an approach to Human 
– System performance has been espoused by 
researchers (Miller & Shattuck, 2004) in the 
study of military command and control.  Citing 
the gap between the focus of analysis of human 
factors practitioners and systems analysts, Miller 
and Shattuck describe a dynamic model of 
situated cognition (DMSC) in which cognitive 
activities are based on the data which flow from 
the environment through the machine portions of 
a complex system.  This approach overcomes 
the limitations of measures used to assess 
cognitive performance, such as some situational 
awareness (SA) metrics, that implicitly depict 
the activity as a state rather than a dynamic 
process.  Moreover, by utilizing the DMSC, 
military accidents can be analyzed 
retrospectively to pinpoint root causes and 
identify ways to improve future performance.  
As an example, this paper applies the DMSC to 




The ability to analyze performance in complex 
systems is vital to the successful design and 
operation of such systems. Analysts and 
designers should include the human and 
machine components.  Such an approach has 
been espoused by researchers in the study of 
military command and control (Miller & 
Shattuck, 2004). Citing the gap between the 
focus of analysis of human factors practitioners 
and systems analysts, Miller and Shattuck 
describe a dynamic model of situated cognition 
(DMSC) in which data flow from the 
environment, through sensors and other machine 
agents to the human agents in the system. This 
approach overcomes the biases which are 
inherent in analytical methods focusing almost 
exclusively either on machine agents or on 
human agents.  In addition, this approach 
overcomes some of the limitations inherent in 
the measurement of cognitive performance 
because it examines the evolving system 
processes rather than a series of discrete system 
states.  The associated metrics used in the 
DMSC also emphasize process over state.  The 
Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition also 
appears to be a valuable framework for the 
retrospective analysis of military accidents.  This 
framework facilitates the identification of root 
causes and potential areas for improvement of 
human performance. 
 
On the afternoon of February 9, 2001, the USS 
Greeneville (SSN 772) collided with the 
Japanese Motor Vessel Ehime Maru off the 
coast of Oahu, Hawaii while performing an 
emergency surfacing maneuver.  Nine civilians 
were lost.  In a separate incident, the USS 
Hartford (SSN 768) ran aground off the coast of 
Italy on October 25, 2003, costing the Navy $9.4 
million in repairs.  While the first incident 
involved submerged operations and the second 
involved surface navigation, there are 
similarities, revealed by the dynamic model of 
situated cognition, as described below.   
 
 
THE DYNAMIC MODEL OF 
SITUATED COGNITION 
 
The DMSC posits that there are various stages 
of technological and cognitive system 
performance (see Figure 1).  On the 
technological side, all the data in the 
environment, data detected by technological 
systems (e.g., sensors), and data available on 
local command and control systems (C2; e.g., 
workstations) are included.  Each of these stages 
includes a subset of what was included in the 








are the perceptual and cognitive systems offered 
by the human operator.  These include data 
perceived by the decision maker, comprehension 
of the decision maker and, finally, projection/ 
prediction of the decision maker.  These 
cognitive stages equate to the three levels of SA 
discussed by Endsley (2000).  Embedded 
between these stages are lenses, which serve to 
focus (or distort) an individual’s cognitive 
processes.  Such lenses embody the context in 
which the situation occurs, and include the 
individual’s unique experiences and cultural 
background, the local situation and, in military 
situations, may include the operation order, 
military doctrine, and rules of engagement. 
 
Technological Aspect of the System 
 
The large oval on the left side of Figure 1 (Oval 
1) depicts ground truth, (i.e., everything in the 
world). Ground truth is dynamic in nature, 
changing with spatial and temporal progression 
although it may be captured at points in time. 
There is no error or uncertainty inherent in Oval 
1. Simulations allow for the accurate 
representation of ground truth. In the real world, 
however, it is understood that Oval 1 cannot be 
measured with total precision and accuracy. The 
blue rectangles and red diamonds in Oval 1 
represent individual data elements for friendly 
and enemy entities. While other things are 
present in the world (e.g., noncombatants, 
weather, terrain, friendly and enemy intent), they 
have been excluded from the figure for 
simplification.  
 
The next oval (Oval 2) shows the elements 
detected by the technological portion of the 
system.  Note that this oval is depicted as a 
subset of the first oval. However, it is not 
apparent what portions of ground truth are being 
detected and what items remain undetected. 
Error or uncertainty can first enter the model at 
Oval 2, taking various forms.  Oval 2 is a subset 
of Oval 1 for a variety of reasons. 
  
• Not enough sensors available to cover 
environment 
• Sensors unable to detect due to lack of 
sensitivity or specificity 
• Enemy activity designed to deceive 
• Sensors may malfunction. 
Inaccuracy or uncertainty in Oval 2 can result in 
error that may be propagated throughout the rest 
of the model.   
 
Oval 3 depicts what is displayed on the decision 
maker’s workstation. These data are a subset of 
what is represented in Oval 2.  Users are able to 
tailor their displays to suit their individual 
preferences.  If the user has the display settings 
adjusted on the C2 screens such that information 
is not displayed, it is possible that 
important, perhaps vital, information may be 
hidden or concealed.   It may not be obvious to 
the user which data have been excluded. Oval 3 
represents yet another entry point for error or 
uncertainty into the model. 
  
Perceptual and Cognitive Aspects of the 
System 
  
The technological aspect feeds into the 
perceptual and cognitive aspects of the DMSC.  
On right side of the model, three lenses are 
depicted (see Figure 1). Each individual has a 
unique lens.  The lens is continually updated and 
is present at three points in the model (see A, B, 
and C in Figure 1) to focus the decision maker, 
to reflect the unique perspective of the decision 
maker, and to provide context. In a military 
context, the lenses are comprised of the 
following information and attributes:  experience 
(societal, cultural and individual), states or 
performance characteristics (system/team and 
individual), specific plans (micro level - the 
temporal context in the days and hours 
preceding the incident), and rules of engagement 
or doctrine (macro level - the temporal context 
in the months preceding the incident).  Together, 
these classes of information influence what is 
perceived by the user or decision maker. 
 
Oval 4 represents all the data actually perceived 
by the decision maker, contains only a portion of 
the data available in previous ovals and may 
include some distortion, a potential source of 
system error.  Perceived data are a small subset 
of the data available in the environment, the 
sensor array, the configuration of the local C2 
display, and are based on the characteristics of 
the decision maker’s lens.   
 
Perceived data are of little value to the decision 
maker until they are processed. The same lens 
components that directed attention and led to 
perception also influence comprehension.  The 
friendly and enemy icons in Oval 5 have been 
linked and reorganized, suggesting that they 
have been processed, represent the 
comprehension of the data elements that were 
perceived.  The oval is embedded in an 
amorphous shape, suggesting that there are other 
possible ways the data could be linked and 
reorganized that would lead to alternative mental 
representations (e.g., situational models) of the 
data. 
 
The final oval (Oval 6) represents the decision 
maker’s projection into the future or his 
prediction.  Alternate views of the battlefield 
within the amorphous shape but outside of Oval 
5 do not contribute to or influence the prediction 
of the decision maker.  Note that the amorphous 
shape that surrounds Oval 6 is larger than that 
which surrounds Oval 5 and contains even more 
alternatives.  This representation depicts the idea 
that there is much greater uncertainty associated 
with prediction.   
 
Description of the DMSC thus far implies that 
processing occurs in a linear fashion from the 
technological side to the perceptual and 
cognitive side.  However, there are feedback 
loops within the model (not shown in Figure 1).  
For example, a projection (Oval 6) can lead the 
decision maker to modify sensor coverage (Oval 
2) or a local C2 display (Oval 3), influence 
perception of data (Oval 4), or influence 
comprehension of data (Oval 5).  Moreover, 
both projection (Oval 6) and comprehension 
(Oval 5) can shape the contents and contours of 




APPLYING THE DYNAMIC 
MODEL OF SITUATED 
COGNITION TO SUBMARINE 
MISHAPS 
 
To further explicate the DMSC, the authors 
applied it retrospectively to two actual 
submarine command and control mishaps on the 
USS Greeneville and the USS Hartford.  We 
employed a process tracing methodology to 
demonstrate the use of the DMSC model and to 
pinpoint where and when the C2 process went 
awry. We then continue the process trace to 
follow the path that lead to the faulty decisions 
that ultimately resulted in mishaps with tragic 
consequences.  These analyses offer guidance on 
how to deter similar events from happening in 
the future.  
 
USS Greeneville (SSN 772) 
 
On February 9, 2001, the U.S. Navy submarine 
USS Greeneville collided with the Japanese 
motor vessel Ehime Maru off the coast of Oahu, 
Hawaii.  The submarine was demonstrating an 
emergency surfacing maneuver for civilian 
guests onboard for a seven-hour distinguished 
visitor cruise.  As it rose to the surface, the 
submarine struck the fishing vessel’s aft port 
quarter, causing the ship to sink in less than 10 
minutes.  Of the 35 Japanese crew, instructors, 
and students onboard the Ehime Maru, 26 were 
rescued while nine remain unaccounted for, 
presumed dead (Executive Summary of USS 
Greenville collision, retrieved 04/14/2005 from 
http://www.cpf.navy.mil/greeneville.html). 
 
The problems started when the submarine fell 
behind schedule by 30 minutes and had less than 
an hour to get to a pre-designated location.  
There were three surface ships in the vicinity of 
the submarine.  The Ehime Maru was closing on 
the USS Greeneville but at this point this 
information only resided in Oval 1 (ground truth 
or data in the environment) and in Oval 2 (data 
detected by sensors) of the DMSC.  The 
information on the closing rate of the Ehime 
Maru was not in Oval 3 (data available on the 
C2 system) because a critical display system was 
not working.  The Analog Video Signal Display 
Unit (AVSDU), located in the control room of 
the submarine where it provides a remote 
display of sonar data used for surface contact 
analysis, was inoperative.  Since information on 
the proximity of the Ehime Maru was not 
available in Oval 3 from the AVSDU, it could 
not be propagated throughout the rest of the 
model.  At this point, the commanding officer 
(CO) of the USS Greeneville made a series of 
decisions and issued orders that created an 
artificial sense of urgency in crewmembers in 
the control room.  This elevated time pressure 
affected the individual lenses (Lens A, B and C 
on the right side of the model) of the 
crewmembers, adversely impacting their ability 
to accurately process the information residing in 
Oval 4 though Oval 6 (perception, 
comprehension, and projection).  
 
One of the decisions made by the CO was to 
prepare to come to periscope depth. Mandatory 
procedures for a submarine to come to periscope 
depth (PD) require that the Officer of the Deck 
(OOD) hold a periscope briefing with 
watchstanders, conduct two good target motion 
analysis (TMA) legs of about three minutes on 
each surface contact, provide the necessary 
report and obtain the CO’s permission to 
proceed to PD.  These procedures were known 
to all crewmen and were part of their lenses The 
CO, however, abbreviated these procedures used 
by the crew to maintain their SA during the PD 
maneuver.  The CO’s decision not only 
compromised the procedures, it virtually assured 
that the data in the environment (Oval 1) 
detected by the sensors (Oval 2) would be 
inaccurate or incomplete.  Hence, the data 
displayed on the C2 workstations (Oval 3) 
would also be inconsistent with Oval 1; and the 
perception, comprehension, and projection 
(Ovals 4, 5, and 6) of the crewmembers with 
regard to the surface contacts would be 
formulated based on erroneous data. 
 
Prior to the CO’s decision to surface, the sonar 
technician reported a new contact to the control 
team.  This information from the human agent 
either did not pass through Lens A in the model 
or was skewed as it passed through.  The result 
was that neither the CO nor the OOD perceived 
  
(Oval 4) the situation properly; they did not 
recognize that the sonar report was information 
on a new contact.  The CO then announced to 
Control that he had a good feel for the contact 
picture and ordered the OOD to proceed to PD 
on the same course.  The OOD was not given 
enough time to develop an accurate picture of 
the surface contact situation.  He did not conduct 
the required periscope brief with watchstanders, 
missing a valuable opportunity to receive and 
critically assess important contact information 
from the sonar.  He was deprived of input from 
both the technological agents and the human 
agents in the system. 
 
Additionally, other crewmembers were not 
given enough time to do their jobs properly.  
Upon hearing the sonar technician’s report of the 
new contact, the FTOW (fire control technician 
of the watch) rushed to complete his analysis of 
three surface contacts prior to PD, overlooking 
an updated 4000 yard closing solution on one of 
the old contacts (the ill-fated Ehime Maru).  His 
focus was entirely on a ’new‘ contact which he 
considered to be the primary contact of interest.  
The FTOW’s lens was skewed by the false sense 
of urgency established by the CO which could 
very well have narrowed the FTOW’s focus of 
attention.  Further, when the FTOW heard the 
CO say he had a good feel for the contact 
picture, he assumed the CO was referring to all 
contacts, including the new one.  This provides 
further evidence of a skewed lens on the part of 
the FTOW, which may have contributed to his 
decision to remain silent, failing to provide the 
CO with corrective information. 
 
The CO’s erroneous perception led to an 
incorrect comprehension (Oval 5) of the 
situation and an inaccurate projection (Oval 6) 
of where the vessels would be in the future.  At 
no time did the CO discuss the surface picture 
with the contact management team to verify a 
common understanding of the surface contacts 
(Ovals 5 and 6, comprehension and projection).  
His own SA of contacts was based on two brief 
walk-throughs of the sonar room and a single 
review of fire control displays.  He was overly 
confident and pressed for time, and failed to 
properly use both the technological agents and 
the human agents in the system to build his 
understanding of the surface picture.  The 
decision to proceed to PD represents a feedback 
loop from Oval 6 (projection) to Oval 1 
(environment).  As the submarine ascended to 
PD, the contents of Oval 1 were changed and 
new data were available for propagation through 
the model. 
 
While at PD, the CO decided to interrupt the 
OOD’s periscope search and performed his own 
abbreviated visual search for surface contacts.  
After the periscope searches by the OOD and 
CO, the FTOW cycled back through his surface 
contacts and correctly calculated a dangerous 
closing solution for one of the contacts, the 
Ehime Maru.  However, the OOD had just stated 
he had seen no close contacts at PD, and the CO 
also said he had no visual contacts.  These 
pronouncements so skewed the lens of the 
FTOW that he doubted his comprehension (Oval 
5) of the situation (that there was a surface 
contact in close proximity to the submarine).  
The FTOW’s erroneous comprehension 
generated a decision and a feedback loop from 
Oval 5 (comprehension) to Oval 3 (C2 
workstation).  He manually overrode the correct 
solution presented by his workstation, physically 
changing the distance of the surface contact 
(Ehime Maru) from 4000 to 9000 yards, 
reflecting the distance to the visual horizon.  The 
FTOW entered this erroneous information into 
the fire control system.  The result of this action 
was that the speed solution of the surface contact 
resulted in an impossible speed solution of 99 
knots. After the periscope searches, the boat 
went “emergency deep”, proceeded to 400 feet, 
and conducted an emergency main ballast tank 
blow.  The ship surfaced underneath the Ehime 
Maru, causing major flooding on that ship which 
sunk rapidly.   
 
USS Hartford (SSN 768) 
 
On October 25, 2003, the USS Hartford ran 
aground east of the island of Caprera near 
Sardinia, Italy while piloting out of the harbor.  
During submarine piloting, the CO and OOD are 
stationed on the bridge, while the other 
navigation and contact management team 
watchstanders are in the control room.   
  
 
The Naval Mishap Investigation Report 
indicated that the primary causes of the incident 
included:  
• Inability of the piloting party to 
accurately fix the position of the ship 
(poor comprehension in Oval 5, which 
was most likely based on inaccurate data 
in Oval 3). 
• Failure to use available charts and 
equipment on the bridge to effectively 
pilot the vessel (failure to use 
information in Oval 3 which led to lack 
of understanding in Oval 5). 
• Inadequate planning and application 
of basic navigation principles in the 
piloting plan to assure success and 
provide the proper warning that the ship 
was heading into danger (biased lenses 
affecting perceptual and cognitive 
processing). 
 
The plan for the USS Hartford on October 25, 
2003 was to take a four “leg” journey out of the 
harbor.  After leaving the pier, the voyage 
management system (VMS - an automatic 
electronic navigation aid) froze and had to be 
rebooted.  This is considered a major 
technological malfunction. All of the pre-entered 
voyage plan data was lost upon rebooting.  The 
boat increased in speed, and an operator noticed 
that there was an inconsistency between the 
Ring Laser Gyro Navigator (RLGN) and the 
Global Positioning System (GPS).  Essentially 
these two sensor systems (Oval 2) were 
providing conflicting data to C2 workstations 
(Oval 3) needed to conduct operations.  The fact 
that an operator noticed the conflict is evidence 
that the data were perceived (Oval 4) and 
comprehended (Oval 5) by at least one  
crewmember.   
 
When the submarine turned into its second leg, 
the navigational fixes seemed accurate.  Thus, 
the system inconsistency perceived and 
comprehended earlier were disregarded.  No 
feedback loop was generated to Oval 2 (sensor 
systems) or Oval 3 (workstations). However, the 
boat increased speed again, and two people left 
the control room to check on the system 
inconsistency.  This time, the perception and 
comprehension did generate a feedback loop.  
This occurred without the CO or XO knowing 
that key personnel left the control room.   
 
The CO then ordered a turn that was almost 500 
yards short of the plan that he discussed earlier 
with the Navigator (NAV), suggesting a failure 
in Oval 6, projection into the future based on 
what was comprehended (Oval 5). At this point 
a GPS waypoint was erroneously plotted on the 
primary plot.  The Assistant Navigator (ANAV) 
instructed the watchstander to enter the 
waypoint for the next turn into the GPS, but it 
was entered in a different reference unit than 
instructed, making the position entered different 
from desired.  The watchstander’s inaccurate 
comprehension led to an erroneous feedback 
loop, which incorrectly updated the data on the 
chart (e.g., his workstation in Oval 3).   
 
The early turn caused confusion because it was 
ordered from the bridge without warning.  In 
addition, because the leg was short, it resulted in 
a turn point that was several hundred yards off 
from what was planned and it required the plan 
to be revised significantly in order to accurately 
fix the boat’s position.  Even though 
crewmembers could not get a good fix, no one 
reported the problem to the bridge or 
recommended that they slow down until a fix 
was gotten.  After the early turn, the control 
room became increasingly confused as to the 
actual location of the boat.  Erroneous 
perceptions (Oval 4), comprehensions (Oval 5), 
and projections (Oval 6) resulted in decisions 
and feedback loops which altered the 
environment (Oval 1), the sensors (Oval 2), and 
the C2 displays (Oval 3) in unexpected ways, 
leading to more mistakes and confusion.   
 
During the same leg, another operator 
incorrectly placed the submarine 400 yards from 
its actual location.  A minute later, they passed 
the revised waypoint for the next turn, but 
nobody on the bridge was aware that they were 
off track.  In the control room they were still 
trying to fix the plot, and they were now not 
only off course, they were completely off the 
chart.  The chart that they should have been 
using contained a warning about shoal water. 
But, the crew still tried to plot a fix on the 
  
previous chart.  Again, the incorrect perceptions, 
comprehensions, and projections led to 
erroneous decisions and feedback loops, which 
influenced the technological portion of the 
system.  The confusion they experienced was a 
result of the mismatch between what they were 
experiencing and what they thought should 
happen based on the contents of their lenses.  As 
a result, they focused their attention (i.e., 
directed their lenses) to resolving the problem 
and missed the fact that they were on the wrong 
chart.  
 
Confounding these series of unrecognized 
errors, the submarine turned onto the fourth leg.  
The water began shoaling, and the fathometer 
showed 100 feet after previously consistent 150 
foot soundings.  The fathometer operator gave a 
three minute warning, more than enough time to 
do something to avoid grounding.  When the 
fathometer reading went from 83 feet to 50 feet, 
the fathometer operator provided another 
warning.  At this point there had not been an 
accurate navigational fix for 14 minutes, even 
though fixes are to be updated every three 
minutes.  This warning was significant enough 
to divert the attention away from the 
navigational problem.  It finally re-directed the 
lens of the OOD and allowed him to perceive 
(Oval 4) and comprehend (Oval 5) the gravity of 
the situation.  In anticipation of what would 
happen if they remained on course (Oval 6), the 
OOD ordered all back full, but the boat 
grounded 1,100 yards off Isola delle Bisce.  
After the boat ran aground, the Squadron 
Commodore took command (he was on the 
bridge during the transit), and said “speed on” 
without a full understanding or knowledge of the 
USS Hartford’s position, going against 
procedure. 
 
Repairs on the submarine cost about $9.4 
million, and many days of operational readiness 
were compromised. The CO of the USS 
Hartford and the Commander of Submarine 
Squadron 22 who was onboard as a pilot were 
both relieved of command.  Six other crewmen 
were charged with dereliction of duty and 




We have demonstrated the utility of the DMSC 
with respect to accident investigation by 
reviewing two recent submarine mishaps 
involving the USS Greeneville and the USS 
Hartford.  Analysis of both cases reveals that the 
technological (e.g., sensor coverage and 
workstation display) and perceptual/cognitive 
(e.g., perception, comprehension, and 
projection) systems, along with experience and 
doctrine, all played an important role in the 
unfolding of events.  For further information on 
the role of situational models and mental models 
in submarine navigational mishaps, see Shobe 
and Severinghaus (2004). 
 
These analyses, along with previous extensions 
of the model to the USS Stark (FFG 31) and USS 
Vincennes (CG 49) mishaps (Shattuck & Miller 
2004), further support the usefulness of a human 
- systems performance approach. Ultimately, 
this approach can inform system designers about 
weaknesses or vulnerabilities in a current or 
planned system and give them data they need to 
make modifications to the design, which, in turn 
will result in better systems and reduced risk to 
humans.  Future incidents may be averted if 
designers, system analysts, and human factors 




Endsley, M.R. “Theoretical underpinnings of 
situation awareness: A critical review.”  In M. R. 
Endsley & D. J. Garland (Eds.), Situation 
awareness analysis and measurement. Mahwah, 
NJ: LEA, 2000. 
 
Executive Summary of USS Greenville 





Miller, N.L., & L.G. Shattuck, “A process model 
of situated cognition in military command and 
control,” Proceedings of the 2004 Command and 
Control Research and Technology Symposium, 
San Diego, CA, June 2004. 
  
 
Shattuck, L. G., & N.L. Miller, “A process 
tracing approach to the investigation of situated 
cognition,” Proceedings of the Human Factors 
and Ergonomics Society's 48th Annual Meeting, 
New Orleans, LA, September 2004. 
 
Shobe, K., & R. Severinghaus, “Submarine 
Operations – New Technology Insertion Impacts 
on the Practice of Navigation & Piloting,” 
Proceedings of the Undersea Human Systems 
Integration Symposium, Newport, RI, 2004. 
 
Nita Lewis Miller, Ph.D. is the director of the 
Humans Systems Integration curriculum and 
serves on the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate 
School in Monterey, California.  Dr. Miller has 
faculty appointments in the Operations Research 
and Systems Engineering Departments where 
she teaches human factors engineering, directs 
thesis research, and pursues her research 
interests in human performance and fatigue.  
Dr. Miller was a National Science Foundation 
Postdoctoral fellow at the USAF School of 
Aerospace Medicine.  She received her Ph.D. in 
Behavioral Sciences from the University of 
Texas, School of Public Health. 
 
Katharine Shobe, Ph.D., LT, MSC, USN, is a 
research psychologist at the Human 
Performance Center Detachment at the 
Submarine Learning Center in Groton, CT.  
Prior to joining the HPC she was the Deputy 
Director of the Human Performance Department 
at the Naval Submarine Medical Research 
Laboratory (NSMRL).  She received her Ph.D. 
in cognitive psychology from Yale University. 
Her research interests include submarine 
decision making, information organization, 
training, and expertise development. 
 
Lawrence G. Shattuck, Ph.D., is a Professor of 
Engineering Psychology at the United States 
Military Academy, West Point, NY.  He is a 
colonel in the U.S. Army with nearly 30 years of 
service.  His responsibilities include managing 
the Engineering Psychology Program and 
directing the activities of the Engineering 
Psychology Laboratory.  His research interests 
include command and control, decision making, 
decision aiding, human error, communication of 
intent, and situated cognition.  He holds a Ph.D. 
from the Ohio State University in Cognitive 
Systems Engineering and is a graduate of the 
Army War College, Rensselaer Polytechnic 
University, and the United States Military 
Academy. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
